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Case No. 11305 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellants, William Gibson McLaughlin and Dennis 
Becker, were convicted of the crime of willfully and 
maliciously breaking into a coin box associated with a 
Public telephone instrument in violation of Section 76-48-28 
u.c.A., 195 3, as amended and appeal to this court from 
their conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellants were charged by information of a 
felony of willful and malicious damage to a public utility. 
I'hey entered pleas of not guilty. The defendants waived 
their right to jury trial and the matter came on regularly 
~:r hc:a.::-ing before the Honorable c. Nelson Day, Judge of 
t~.e District Court of the Fif1::.r1 _;,1,Jici'll Gi::;t.cict, 
Washington County, State of Ut~ih. At the clo::;e of the 
Both defendants were found guilty of th<:: off<::ns": ch"ir-:J"=:::i 
and committed to the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal and remand for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
About 5:30 A.M. of the 8th of May, 1967, tv:o your.';)' 
men were observed tampering with a telephone ne::r the 
store of Mr. Quentin A. Nissan in Washington, Uta:1. i'.::". 
Nisson observed the incident from his bedroom window 
approximately 68 feet from the booth. He observed tv:o 
young men, he testified, "one was dressed in blue and he 
~s completely in blue pants, that is, dark pants and d~rk 
shirt, was inside the booth and he was up to the telephone 
working, not trying to phone, but in the act of trying to 
get the telephone off, because I could see objects in his 
hands", the other man was outside the phone booth and h3d 
objects in his hands. (TR. 58-59). A car was parked near 
by and Mr. Nissan testified that the car was a dark C3~ 
With round tail lights, but he was unable to determine 
''',2 color of the car or type of license plate; he did 
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telephone booth wis ar:-tificially illumin.:iled fr-om within 
anJ the ::ire1 in the vicinity of the booth w:is lii]hted by 
a str-cet light. r-1.r. Nissan made these observations in 
3pproxi:';1tely one-half minute. (TR. 73). 
~~. Nissan notified the Highway Patrol of the incident 
by calling the Utah Highway Patrol Station about two miles 
from his home; while still in contact with the station on 
the telephone, Mr. Nissan was informed that a car had been 
stopped and was asked to go out to the place where the car 
was stopped. The car, occupied by Bonnie Jean Winget, 
Barbara Galloway, William Gibson McLaughlin and Dennis 
Pecker-, was stopped approximately one and a quarter miles 
from the Nissan store. When Mr. Nissan arrived at the 
scene where the car was stopped, Officer Pfoutz had the 
two men at gun point at the back of their car. Mr. Nissan 
identified the defendants as being the same two men he saw 
in and around the telephone booth. (TR. 63). At trial, 
Mr. Nissan identified the defendants as being the same 
persons he had seen at the scene of the crime and later, 
or.e and a quarter miles down the road at the point of 
Officer Pfoutz gun. (TR. 65). 
Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz, city policeman for the City 
Jf St. George, put the defendants and their two women 
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St. George City Jail where they •,1•::re gi '1en thi::; i:.ir"l.nC3. 
~liranda warning they requ~sted an attorney: (T2. ~S-37! 
"Q. Were all of the defendants present at t~.e 
time you overhe0rd officer \'Thi tehead advise t~:e::-t 
of their rights? 
A. Yes, sir, I believe so, yes, sir. 
Q. What happened next? 
A. The two gentlemen indicated that they didn't--
MR. PICKETT: Just a minute. We object to 
any indication or interpretation, any indic2tions. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) State what you did. 
THE COURT: Mr. Witness, when you say they 
indicated, why, that's your conclusion as to what 
they did. You may state the substance of what t'.-'.ey 
said. No one will expect you to remember their 
exact language at this time, unless it was taken 
down electronically or like the Court Reporter is 
doing it now; but you may state in substance what 
was said, if you remember. 
THE WITNESS: They said that--didn't say a 
heck of a lot. They did want an attorney. 
MR. PICKETT: Now, just a minute, your Honor, 
when they sdy there are four of them, we would like 
to know--
MR. BURNS: May I wi thdra1v the question, 
your Honor? I withdraw the last question and will 
move forward in a different area. 
THE COURT: His answer mav stand that thev 
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SLl~.;:1~~c of ~h3t he W3S 
(frt::tU3lS ,3dded) 
:-:.-;:'.3 ~r.e 
Cn er· al'out the 18th of Hiy, 1967, an incidPnt 
o::ur-rt:~ in the Washington County Juil, St. Vc:or<:;e, Utah, 
w"e:t' ::'·e Jefendants, McLaughlin and Becker, were incar-
ccratc:l 1,·:;i ting trial. According to the tes tk,ony of 
Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz, defendant McLaughlin made an 
a~ission against his own interest; to the effect that 
they hadn't broken into the box maliciously, they had 
.dor.e it for money. Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz identified 
the decl2rer1t to be William Git., )n McLaughlin, though 
~. ~~l2u;~lin was located in a different room of the 
;1~1 and could not be seen by Mr. Pfoutz at the time the 
stater.ent was heard. (TR. 99-102). Testimony of Officer 
Pfoutz is set forth below: 
"Q. Now, state what happened. 
A. Mr. Becker was awake when I went into 
the jail. He asked me if I had a cigarette. 
I opened the main door, walked back into the 
section, handed him a cigarette. 
Q. What happened, then? 
A. I walked back outside and locked the door, 
picked up a piece of paper that was on a table 
in the room there. 
Q. What happened next? 
A. ~~. Becker spoke up. Apparently he had 
':he took out there, thrown the book out 
bo k He asked or told me that a pocket o • 
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if I had picked up that tssk, t~it it w::=n't 
any good, tlic-1t he h::iri alrc,::dy u:,-id th~ book 
and it wasn't worth ~~adir.1. 
Q. Whcit did you say? 
A. I told him that I hadn't picked up the 
book, that I h;:id picked up the cor'.[)l;c;ir.t eir.d 
the warrant thr:it had been sworn out ag-:iinst 
them. 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. He said--! don't renember exactly. 
O. As near as you can recall, what did 
Dennis Becker say? 
A. He asked me what it said. I am not positive 
on this. He asked me what it said and I began 
to read it out loud. 
MR. PICKETT: The book or the conplaint? 
THE WITNESS: Pardon me. 
MR. PICKETT: The book or the complaint? 
THE WITNESS: The complaint. 
Q. (By Mr. Burns) What did he say? 
A. I was reading and I just got started, and 
as I got to the part, "Did willfully and rn:ili-
ciously break into a coin box," Mr. McLaughlin 
spoke up and stated that they hadn't broken ~ -1 to 
this box maliciously. They had done it for 
money. 
Q. Could you distinguish their voices? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you talked to them before? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And you recognized the voice saying 
they h'-ld done it for money as that of William 
Gibson McLaughlin, is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. BURNS: I have nothing further of 
this witness." 
Defendant Dennis Becker was in the portion of the jail 
referred to as the tank with defendant McLaughlin when 
the statement to the effect that they had done it for 
money was made by defendant McLaughlin; Becker did not 
deny the assertion or make any other comment about 
McLaughlin's statement. (TR. 99). 
POINT I 
THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE FACT THAT 
THE DEFENDANTS ASKED FOR AN ATTORNEY AFTER 
BEING GIVEN A PRE-INTERROGATION WARNING WAS 
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS. 
Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz testified that the defendant 
Dennis Becker and defendant William Gibson McLaughlin were 
given a pre-interrogation warning and in response to that 
warning they requested an attorney. The law is clear 
that tacit admissions either by remaining silent in the 
fact of accusation or requesting an attorney in the face 
of accusation cannot be used against the defendant as a 
means of penalizing a defendant for exercising his Fifth 
A~enr:Jrn.ent privilege. Dennis Becker and William McLaughlin 
',:~re coxercising their Fifth Amendment privilege when they 
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the testimony of Officer Pfoutz, thcit d<'~fendcints requ-=-sted 
an attorney, the defc:nd,'l.nts' con:~titution;il ri']ht:; w::r•: 
violated. 
In United State·::; v. Brierly, 267 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. 
Pa., 1967), held that a tacit admission is involunt0ry 
~ ~ and its use is thus barred by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court st:=:.ted, 
"we think that neither this Circuit nor the Suprer..e Court 
. would sustain the validity of a tacit admission as evidence 
in any criminal proceeding, • " . . 
In Gamble v. State, 210 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1968), 
the court reached the same conclusion: 
"In view of the Miranda case it would not be 
permissible to penalize a defendant for exer-
cising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he 
was under police custodial interrogation by 
permitting the prosecution to use at trial 
the fact that he remained silent in the face 
of an accusation." 
Clearly an expression of a desire to have an attorney 
is a Fifth Amendment privilege of equal weight and should 
not be used by the prosecutor for the purpose of creating 
a negative inference of guilt. 
The fact that testimony was given to the effect that 
d~fendants, Becker and McLau::ihlin, requested an attorney 
'•:is a denial of their constitutional right to a fair trial 
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anJ a Cc'nL1l of due process of the law. Further, the 
t:-ial com:t expressly indicuted the testimony could remuin 
in evi,ic'!1c:e in spite of defense objection. Thus the court 
appJrently weighed its judgment on the erroneous evidence. 
Introduction of such testimony is prejudicial and results 
in an unfair trial because it reflects upon the question 
of guilt of the defendants. Clearly there can be an infer-
ence of guilt when an individual requests an attorney after 
receiving a pre-interrogation warning since some would 
conclude, no matter how erroneously, that only a guilty 
person would feel that he might make incriminating state-
ments without the aid of an attorney. Miranda Vo State of 
~' 384 u.s. 436, 1602, (1966), closes the door to the 
•admissibility of such testimony. Footnote thirty-seven of 
the Court's opinion in Miranda states: 
"In accord with our decision today, it is 
impermissible to penalize an individual 
for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
when he is under police custodial interroga-
tion. The prosecution may not, therefore, 
use at trial the fact that he stood mute or 
claimed his privilege in the face of accusa-
tion." 
See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.So 609 (1965); 
~~an v. California, 386 U.S. 609 (1967). 
People v. H;insard,, 53 Ca.Jo Rptr. 918 (1966) supports 
t:.i:; vi<.:·110 In that case an officer was allowed to testify 
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~fendant stated th0t he th0u'Jht h~ h~d bett~r talk to 
his attorney before st;-itin'J anythin'J furt:--,er, tr,e c 0 1.irt 
by silence when the defendant vJC1s ezercisin'J his core::: ti tu-
tional right under People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 333, 42 
Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965). In the H-:i.r,s~.-:-d case, 
supra, the court said, "The accused's con.stitution-:i.l right 
to remain silent and to consult with an attorney cannot 
be exploited to his disadvantage by conversion into an 
inference of guilty consciousness . . . " 
Since the prosecution had no intention of introducing 
statements obtained as a result of interrogation of the 
' defendants, the circumstances under which the testimony 
that the defendants requested an attorney was introduced 
must have been to demonstrate the resulting inference 
of consciousness of guilt. In the Hansard case, supra, 
the court found that admission of testimony to the effect 
that defendant thought he had better talk to an attorney 
strictly for the purpose of suggesting to the jury an 
indication of defendant's consciousness of guilt was 
erroneous. Since the error was of constitutional pro-
'· · d 1 ·t be said that Pf rtions reversal is require un ess 1 can 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." the error was harmless 
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I 
wr.tr1 the facts in this case are examined against the proper 
sloti,1~1rd it is clear upon the record that admission of the 
st3ten:ent that defendants requc:.ted un attorney after 
being given a pre-interrogation wo.rnlng wus a pre judicial 
error requiring a new trial. The evidence absent intro-
duction of this testimony is insufficient to obtain a 
.conviction of either one or both of' the defendants. The 
evidence against defendants Becker and ri'cLaughlin is 
meager. Hr. Nissan's identification is questionable. He 
,wcs sixty-eight feet away from the phone booth when he 
'observed one man tampering with the phone, and one outside 
holding an object, he only observed their activity for 
about thirty seconds, he was unable to recognize the color 
'of the car or even the origin or color of its license 
plate, it was dark outside except for the artificial 
illumination of the phone booth and a street light, and 
'yet he testified that he recognized the defendants in 
w1rt as being the defendants he saw tampering with the 
phone. It is much more likely that Mr. Nisson recognized 
·the defendants Becker and McLaughlin because they were 
the same persons he observed at the point of Officer Pfoutz 
gun. It is very likely that Mr. Nisson converted the 
-ir.~rirninating factors of observing the defendants, Becker 
arid McLau1hlin, at the point of Officer Pfoutz gun, a mile 
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psitive idcr1tificc1tion of the lv10 youncJ r:en. It "'""::, too 
identify a p'C'rson or per::;ons at a distance of sixt;-ei-:;1-it 
feet under id en tic al 1 igh tin'] conditions. 
Another factor this court must consider in deter-
mining whei-_ c the error of ack,itting this testiriony in, 
wos pre judicial, is whether the trial judge considered 
this evidence in deciding the guilt of the defendants. 
The record shows that the trial judge did consicer this 
evidence significant since he allowed into evidence the 
testimony of Officer Pfoutz even after the question had 
been withdrawn. (TR. 97). 
Since it is evident from the record that the trial 
judge considered the testimony of Officer Pfoutz that 
defendants requested an attorney and since the other 
evidence against the defendants was somewhat weak it 
cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
did not affect the trial court's judgmento 
POINT II 
INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF AN ADMISSION 
OF DEFENDANT, WILLIA!'-! GIBSON McLAUGHLIN, 
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR AS TO DENNIS BECKER 
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A..';O A VI(>LATIC, OF' f!IS COii'..Jl'IrUTIO~JAL RIGHT 
TO co;a•'t{Oi:':i.'ATIOiJ A:rn \·!AS Ff\E.JUDICIAL EWWR. 
Officer· Joseph A. Pfoutz testified that on the 
tr.ey h·Lln' t committed the offen.:;e m:iliciously, they had 
c0c,1:i t: te'.:l it for money. It was prejudicial error to allow 
this testimony into evidence against both defendants for 
l110 reasons. First, the United States Supreme Court 
established the rule applicable to this case in Bruton v. 
Uhlted States, 88 So Ct. 1620 (1968). In that case the 
court held that oral statements made by one defendant 
11hi:h incriminated both defendants were admissible as 
;n exc-c:ption to the hearsay rule as against the defendant 
;,3king the statement but could not be used against his 
co-defendant. The court held that "admission of Evans' 
confession in ~-a _7 joint trial violated /Bruton' ~7right 
of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment." Even though the Bruton case 
was a jury tried case, the policy used in that case is 
opplicable in this case. To demonstrate the strength 
of the desire to protect an indi viducil 's right to the 
~rotection of the confrontation clause, it should be 
rcint "d out that the Supreme Court of the United States 
~-ur.'j prejudicial error even though the trial court gave 
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Jr>Jr, C'Jnci::;e and W1d·~r:::tc:tr.'~'Ll<:! ir . .::;~1z:tion that tr,e 
confe::;sion could only br" u::;•:d '-''}~1:ri:;t the declCirant and 
~ust b 0 di::;re']''lrdr_:d v1ith r<:'::;[)•:ct ~,, t!-.e d•,clar"lnt'::; 
d~fcr1ddnto 
CG-
It may be argued th21t the 8r1J'=0r, decision should not 
apply since Dennis Becker wc:is in the sa;:,e roon as the 
declarant, William G. McLaughlin, when the adI 0.ission was 
made, and Dennis Becker did not object or deny the aC.."'.'ission. 
lliis is the second basis of error. The Utah law is clear 
on this point. In State v. Farnsworth, 14 Utah 2d 303, 
383 P.2d 489 (1963), this court found prejudicial error 
where the trial court admitted testimony of an alleged 
accomplice's brother who occupied cell with defend:int, 
• that in presence of defendant, the accomplice told his 
brother that they could only be charged with receiving 
and the defendant remained silent. The facts of the 
Farnsworth case and those currently before the Court 
are virtually identical and the instant case is indis-
tinguishable from Farnswortho Therefore, though Dennis 
Becker was in the same room as William Gibson McLaughlin, 
Becker's failure to deny the incriminatory statenent of 
his co-defendant could not be used against him as a 
tacit admission. 
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Thi::; is not a harsh or w--.u.:::u :.:1 turden to place on 
the St0 tt'.• Under: tradi tion.:il rule::; of evidence the hearsay 
5t3 tcrncnt inculp.:tting Dermis Becker is clearly inadmissible. 
~:1rrc is no recognized exception to tr.e hearsay rule insofar 
as Dennis Fe,~ker is concerned and tr.erefore any violation 
of the hears0y rule raises questions under the Confrontation 
Clause. A defendant's constitutional right to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him includes the right to cross-
examine those witnesses; this right is a fundamental right 
and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth 
Mendment. See Pointer v. State of ~exas, 380 U.S. 400, 
(1965). In the present case, it is obvious that William 
l·:cLaughlin' s statement of May 18, 196 7, that they "hadn't 
. done it maliciously they had done it for money," was a 
substantial admission. To the extent it was used by the 
uial court against Becker, his constitutional rights 
were violated as well as prejudicial error committed under 
Prior case law of this State. Reversal as to Becker is 
required. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's apparent consideration of the 
e<idencf=>, that the appellants upon being given the Miranda 
1:0rning requested counsel, requires reversal and a new 
lrial. Ch0.prnan v. California, supra. 
_, 'i-
This court should reverse. 
Respectfully su'crr1itted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Salt Lake County Bar 
Legal Services, Inc. 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellants 
